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Abstract: In this paper I begin by examining Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement. 
My	contention	is	 that	this	account	 is	so	deeply	flawed	as	to	cast	doubt	on	the	pos-
sibility that such deep disagreements actually happen. Nevertheless, I contend that 
the notion of deep disagreement itself is a useful theoretical foil for thinking about 
argumentation. The second part of this paper makes this case by showing how think-
ing about deep disagreements from the perspective of rhetoric, Walton- style argu-
mentation theory, computation, and normative pragmatics can all yield insights that 
are useful no matter what one’s orientation within the study of argument. Thus, I con-
clude that deep disagreement–even if it were to turn out that there are no real-world 
occurrences of it to which we can point–is useful for theorists of argumentation. In 
this wise, deep disagreement poses a theoretical (and not, as is widely thought, a 
practical) challenge for argumentation theory not unlike that posed by radical skepti-
cism for traditional epistemology. 
Keywords: Deep disagreement, Fogelin, argumentation, Wittgenstein.
Resumen: En este trabajo comienzo examinando la perspectiva de Fogelin sobre 
el desacuerdo profundo. Mi alegato es tanto que esta perspectiva es profundamente 
defectuosa como sembrar dudas sobre la posibilidad de que tales desacuerdos pro-
fundos realmente sucedan. Sin embargo, mantengo que la noción de desacuerdo pro-
fundo en sí misma es una herramienta teórica útil para pensar la argumentación. La 
segunda parte de este trabajo argumenta por esto mostrando cómo pensar los des-
acuerdos profundos desde las perspectivas retórica, al estilo de la teoría de la argu-
mentación de Walton, la computación, y la pragmática normativa, arrojando luz útil 
todos estos campos sin importar la orientación que uno tenga dentro del estudio de 
la argumentación. De este modo, concluyo que el desacuerdo profundo –incluso en el 
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caso que nos demos cuenta que no hay en el mundo ocurrencias reales a las que poda-
mos señalar– es teóricamente útil para los teóricos de la argumentación. En esta vena, 
el desacuerdo profundo instala un desafío teórico (y no, como se piensa ampliamente, 
uno práctico) para la teoría de la argumentación sin diferencia al que se instala por el 
escepticismo radical en la epistemología tradicional.
Palabras clave: Desaceurdo profundo, Fogelin, argumentación, Wittgenstein.
1. Introduction 
The last ten years have seen what many interpret to be an unprecedented 
intensification	of	divisiveness	in	both	domestic	and	international	political	
rhetoric. Internationally, the clash between fundamentalist visions of Islam 
and the largely secular ideologies of much of the West seems intractable. 
In the US and Europe, the discourse between left-leaning and right-leaning 
political parties and their representatives in the media frequently borders 
on the apoplectic. It is perhaps no surprise then, that recent years have 
seen a renewed interest in deep disagreement among students of informal 
logic and argumentation theory. 
In this paper, I shall argue that much of this attention is perhaps mis-
placed. Deep disagreement, though no doubt a phenomenon of some inter-
est and importance, is nowhere near as troubling a prospect as has often 
been assumed. I will show this in three steps. First I will begin with an analy-
sis of Fogelin-type deep disagreement, offering several arguments to show 
that	the	line	of	argument	that	first	introduced	deep	disagreement	into	the	
literature is based on questionable assumptions. Second, I will argue that 
even if we allow that deep disagreement of a profound sort exists (as I believe 
that we should), the philosophy of argument provides us with completely 
adequate resources for dealing with it. Lastly, I will conclude the paper by 
arguing that even though this is the case, the idea of deep disagreement can 
still play a useful methodological role for theorists of argumentation. 
2. Fogelin’s Case for Deep Disagreement 
It will be helpful to have a rough sketch of Fogelin’s argument in hand. The 
following summary is drawn from Fogelin (1985). 
41
1. Any disagreement is resolved only when all parties are rationally con-
vinced of the position of one of the parties. 
2. Argumentation is the primary means by which such resolutions take 
place. 
3. A deep disagreement is a clash not between individual propositions 
or arguments, nor is it simply the failure of one or more parties to 
sincerely engage the dialectic (i.e. “pig-headedness”) but between in-
commensurable forms of life—deeply rooted frameworks of ground-
ing assumptions, values, and practices. 
4. If two forms of life are incommensurable then there is no way of rec-
onciling them by rational means. 
5. The notion of “forms of life” includes such things as standards of 
argumentation. 
6. This means that argumentation is powerless in the face of deep dis-
agreements; it effects nothing. 
7. Therefore deep disagreements must be approached through non-
rational persuasion. 
8. That such an important class of disagreements cannot be handled by 
rational	means	suggests	troubling	limits	to	the	efficacy	of	argument.	
In what follows I will offer some reasons to doubt key premises of this 
argument,	particularly	its	first,	fourth,	and	fifth	premises.	My	focus	on	these	
premises is not meant to indicate that the others are uncontroversial. Indeed, 
nearly every premise of the argument has met with substantial challenge at 
some point.1 I simply will not be challenging them in order to focus on what I 
take to be more important points. It is to these points that I now turn. 
3. Some Criticisms of Fogelin’s Argument
 
3.1. Fogelin’s Premise 1: Victory as the Proper Aim of Argument 
The	first	difficulty	with	Fogelin’s	argument	 is	 that	 it	 fundamentally	mis-
construes the aim of argument. Fogelin’s assumption is that we argue to 
1 An excellent overview of the literature around this argument is contained in a paper 
given in Finocchiaro (2011).
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achieve a victory for our point of view, and that an issue is resolved only 
when the dispute is settled in favor of one or the other thesis. This assump-
tion	views	dialectical	exchange	in	far	too	flat	a	way.	As	I	have	argued	else-
where (Patterson, 2011) and as many others have said before me, includ-
ing, most recently Johnson (2009) and especially Pinto (2010), and (well 
before all of us if in a slightly different way) Jacobs (1987) to name just a 
few, the point of argument has at least as much–and perhaps even more–to 
do with coordinative purposes than competitive ones. This is evident in the 
very common experience of an exchange of ideas resulting in the produc-
tion of new ideas and positions that represent that consensus or coordina-
tion. Rather than one party emerging as the victor and another the loser, 
it may well turn out that everyone wins (if a mutual understanding can 
be reached over a “third way”) or that everyone loses (if, for example the 
parties simply squander time and good will talking past one another). This 
is especially true of practical deliberations, where the view that achieves 
consensus is very often not one advocated from the start by some party, 
but a compromise position that is acceptable to all, even if it wasn’t what 
anyone had in mind at the beginning of the deliberations. If it is true that 
dialectical exchange frequently enough results in convergence on such 
“third alternatives” then it seems reasonable to doubt that the resolution 
of a dispute always–or even most of the time–means the triumph of one 
party’s standpoint or thesis over that of the other participants.2 There are 
other alternatives too. It may be, for example, that the parties discover in 
exchange that their differences are merely verbal, or that new facts render 
their	difference	of	opinion	moot.	Hence	the	first	premise	of	Fogelin’s	argu-
ment seems doubtful. 
3.2. Fogelin’s Premises 4 and 5: The Incommensurability 
 Premises 
Fogelin’s fourth premise is that there can be no rational way of reconcil-
ing two incommensurable forms of life. In essence, Fogelin’s reasoning is 
that incommensurability between two positions in a dispute is a product 
2 Indeed, it isn’t clear that such a mindset is even a desirable one with which to enter 
into	argumentation	in	the	first	place,	but	more	on	this	later.	
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of the positions of the parties being derived from two antecedent (also 
incommensurable) frameworks. Since it seems clear that there disputes 
where the points of view are incommensurable, it follows that there are 
deep, incommensurable frameworks too. This line of reasoning deserves 
careful scrutiny. All hangs on whether or not there are plausible alterna-
tive explanations of incommensurability between positions besides deeply 
incommensurable frameworks. As one might think of the requisite incom-
mensurability either from the perspective of the individual or from that of 
the group to which she might belong, I address both sorts in order to show 
that this premise, for all it’s apparent “common-sense” appeal, must fall 
short of the mark. 
3.2.1. Incompetent Epistemic Agency and Rational 
 Incommensurability 
Though Fogelin doesn’t make such a claim, it should be clear that the point 
made in this premise is a close cousin to the position in moral philosophy 
that the existence of sustained disagreement over time establishes some 
or other skeptical position with regard to moral realism. Thus, it calls for a 
particularly full-blooded reply. Let us begin this reply with a brief look at 
a highly effective response to the problem of disagreement in ethics, that 
offered by David Brink. 
Brink’s principle concern is to respond to the moral skepticism of John 
Mackie by way of answering Mackie’s charge that the realist bears the bur-
den of proving that actual moral disagreements are at least in-principle re-
solvable. Brink agrees that the moral realist bears this burden. His strategy 
for	discharging	it	involves	three	principal	avenues	of	response.	The	first	of	
these involves clarifying the nature and scope of Mackie’s charge. The sec-
ond rests on a closer analysis of the details of actual moral disagreements, 
and the third addresses what Brink refers to as the “diachronic” nature of 
Mackie’s charge–that element that focuses on the endurance of moral dis-
agreement over large stretches of time. Of these three aspects of Brink’s 
response, only the second two are really relevant to the present discussion. 
This is because, unlike Mackie’s stance regarding moral disagreements, Fo-
gelin’s does not involve commitment to the position that no disagreements 
of any sort are ever rationally resolved. Fogelin’s position concern is with 
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only a limited subset of disagreements that are beset by the property of be-
ing	unresolvable.	Thus	Brink’s	first	strategy,	which	relies	on	showing	that	
Mackie is wrong to think that all moral disagreements are of a piece in be-
ing unresolvable by rational means, is somewhat idle here. 
The second of Brink’s strategies is not idle, however, as it counsels spe-
cial	care	in	looking	at	the	finer	details	of	moral	disagreements.	If	we	look	
hard enough, Brink argues, we will see that a number of possibilities ac-
count for the recalcitrance of the disagreement that have little or nothing 
to do with the fact that they are moral disagreements. Instead, they have to 
do with the nonmoral facts attendant to the situation. We can simplify his 
position by classifying these possibilities into two categories: those relating 
to agents and those relating to underlying factual considerations. In both 
cases, the failure to achieve agreement is not due to the fact of the dispute’s 
being	a	moral	one,	but	due	to	failings	of	the	agents	or	difficulties	that	beset	
the circumstances in which they must exercise their rational powers. With 
respect	to	the	first	category,	which	Brink	describes	as	an	agent’s	being	cul-
pably ignorant of information that would make resolution possible, he has 
this to say: 
Often, at least one disputant culpably fails to assess the nonmoral 
facts	correctly	by	being	insufficiently	imaginative	in	weighing	the	con-
sequences for various people of different actions or policies. Culpable 
failure	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 imaginative	may	 result	 from	negligence	 (e.g.	
laziness), prejudice, self-interest, or social ideology. Brink (1989, pp. 
198-209) 
Now, Fogelin does address something like this concern when he dismisses 
from the category of deep disagreement those disagreements that are the 
product of one or both parties being merely “pig-headed”. To this much I 
think, Brink and Fogelin would agree. Brink’s point is larger in scope, how-
ever, as he goes on to address cases of non-culpable ignorance that result 
in moral disagreement (my emphasis): 
Other genuine moral disputes depend on reasonable (non-culpable) but 
nonetheless resolvable disagreements over the non-moral facts. The 
correct answers to controversial moral questions often turn on nonmor-
al issues about which reasonable disagreement is possible and to which 
no one may know the answer. (ibid.) 
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The emphasized portion of this sentence is key. Just because the rel-
evant nonmoral facts may not be known at the time of the disputants’ clash 
in viewpoints, this is no reason to conclude that they could not, in time, 
come	 to	 be	 known	with	 sufficient	 generality	 as	 to	 render	 the	moral	 dis-
agreement moot. Still other possibilities are that the agents lack the capac-
ity to understand the relevant non-moral facts, or that these facts are so 
complex and so numerous as to confound even a well-meaning and other-
wise bright epistemic agents. Still again, it may be that the agents’ failure 
to understand the nonmoral facts is due to their non-culpable adherence to 
the	best	scientific	theories	available	to	them	under	conditions	that	will	later	
be discovered to be systematically misleading with respect to the subject 
matter of their debate (e.g. vociferous disagreement about the movement 
of phlogiston prior to the discovery of chemical catalysts). In such cases 
the parties may simply be doing the best they can on the strength of their 
intuitions and whatever partial understanding of the non-moral facts they 
can manage. Resilient disagreement under such conditions would hardly 
be a surprise. Note, however, that in cases like these the failure to achieve 
resolution for a long-standing disagreement, though it would still be due 
primarily to the shortcomings of the agents, would not involve “pig-head-
edness” in Fogelin’s sense. In such a case we would be wrong to infer from 
any apparent incommensurability in the agents’ points of view any conclu-
sions	about	the	prospects	for	finding	a	rational	resolution	to	their	disagree-
ment. We would be similarly wrong to dismiss their disagreement as not 
posing a counterexample to the idea of deep disagreement too. 
If the forgoing is sensible, then we should have some reason to doubt 
that apparent incommensurability between the points of view of persons 
entails that their attempts to resolve those disputes using rational means 
are doomed to failure. On the contrary, it may simply be that the incom-
mensurability of their points of view is a temporary condition imposed on 
them by the epistemic circumstances of their difference of opinion. But 
what of differences of opinion that are the product not of disputes tied to 
poorly understood facts, but of clashes between “life-worlds” or ways of 
living we associate with the term “culture” and its cognates? Surely these 
will seem to many to be better candidates for generators of actual deep dis-
agreements as adherence to one’s cultural values and ways of being seems, 
on	some	level,	to	be	reflexive;	not	the	subject	of	rational	reflection.	Perhaps	
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then cultural differences generate the kind of incommensurability that ren-
ders our rational faculties powerless? 
3.2.2. Cultural or Group Difference and Rational 
 Incommensurability 
It would seem that cultural differences do not render us powerless. We 
learn from Liu (1999), for instance, that different cultures or “forms of life” 
may not just hypothetically understand each-other’s reasoning but can 
and actually do take on each other’s modes of reasoning when dealing with 
questions	of	value.	This	point	is	confirmed	independently	in	Suzuki	(2008)	
and	 in	Harpine	(1993).	This	flies	 in	 the	 face	of	Fogelin’s	contention	 that	
different forms of life contain different standards of argumentation, a key 
point in his argument for deep disagreement. If Liu, Suzuki, and Harpine 
are correct then standards of argumentation are not wholly creatures of an-
tecedent cultural or ideological frameworks.3 This should not be a surprise, 
as a diverse array of empirical research programs in cognitive science and 
psychology suggest the same thing.4 Surely then at least some skepticism 
as to Fogelin’s assumption that one’s standards of argumentation are prod-
ucts of one’s “life-world” is warranted. 
Even if one were inclined to generosity on this score, however, Fogelin’s 
view would not escape the further problem that individuals and groups, si-
multaneously inhabit more than one “way of life”. To put the point another 
way, no one is only a Muslim, or just Canadian. The social and cultural vec-
tors that bear on individual and collective self-image and beliefs are many, 
and are interrelated and interwoven in complex ways. These take the form 
of	 social	 roles	 (father,	 police	 officer,	 daughter,	 etc.),	 genders,	 linguistic	
communities,	 historically-defined	 groupings	 (WWII-era	 Russian	 Jews),	
memberships in various projects (those concerned about saving Tiger Sta-
dium in Detroit, those advocating for women’s rights in Chile), as well as 
3 Note that this need not be seen as a claim that such standards are universal. That 
claim is not made in any of the three essays cited here. It has, however, been advanced in 
Hanna (2006). 
4 For a classic sampling of these see Kahneman/Tversky (2000), Gentner/Kokinov 
(2001), and most recently Mercier/Sperber (2011). 
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the sort of communities of belief that Fogelin envisions in his examples of 
abortion	and	affirmative	action.	All	such	“life-worlds”	overlap	and	form	a	
tangle	of	influences	that	bear	on	who	a	person	conceives	herself	to	be,	what	
she believes and how she argues. The point here is that there are no strict 
divides between persons, no ideological gulfs so wide that no points of com-
monality exist that could be leveraged in order to make rational appeals to 
persons who do not share our views. Simply because persons may belong to 
different cultures or classes of person does not necessarily mean that their 
views are going to be incommensurable. In fact, we often do argue outside 
of our own social set of descriptors, or leverage one descriptor above oth-
ers to make a point. One can imagine the sort of questions that would arise 
in Fogelin’s abortion example as a case in point. Suppose Alva is against 
abortion and Britt thinks it should be legal. Would we be surprised to hear 
Britt	appeal	to	social	roles	defined	outside	of	their	positions	on	abortion	to	
make her arguments? “What if it was your sister, or your daughter?” she 
might ask, hoping to show that Alva’s ideological commitment is incon-
sistent with commitments he might have in his role as brother or father. If 
such questions can be legitimate–if they can be rational, as I believe that 
they can– then I think that they suggest that a more textured view of how 
“forms of life” shape our arguing practices is in order than the one implicit 
in Fogelin’s argument. 
3.3. Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian Grounds for Rational 
 Incommensurability 
With so many contra-indications to the idea that incommensurable positions 
signal the presence of deep, incommensurable frameworks or “life-worlds” 
it is worth asking what the grounds are on which Fogelin advances it in the 
first	place.	Those	who	know	the	essay	well	know	that	his	grounds	ostensibly	
are Wittgensteinian. The upshot of Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian case is that the 
bedrock commitments of one’s own “life-world” behave in much the same 
way that the “hinge propositions” of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty would–
they so anchor the moral dimensions of Alva’s and Britt’s life- world that to 
think otherwise appears to miss something not just blindingly obvious but 
foundationally important to any adequate understanding of–and certainly 
any	reasonably	proficient	use	of	language	about–this	aspect	of	the	world.	
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But can there be “private” hinge propositions like this? It seems a deeply 
problematic interpretation of Wittgenstein, especially when Wittgenstein’s 
ambivalence about the idea of hinge propositions is so well known and so 
clearly evident in On Certainty.5 Though this is not the place for such an 
investigation, it seems to me for various reasons that there could not be, on 
pain of accepting deeply problematic forms of philosophical intuitionism in 
ethics. One has to bear in mind that for Wittgenstein there is a rather im-
portant difference between a proposition’s being the case, its seeming to be 
the case, and its being impossible for one to imagine that it is not the case. 
With	hinge	propositions,	we	not	 only	find	ourselves	 closest	 to	 the	 latter	
situation, we simply cannot speak sensibly to our linguistic fellows without 
committing ourselves to them to at least some degree. This is manifestly 
not the case with moral controversies like the one over abortion, no matter 
how deeply felt. It’s not that Alva and Britt cannot understand one another. 
In fact they understand each other perfectly well. It is this very fact that 
brings about their disagreement in the first place!6 If the difference be-
tween Alva and Britt rested on their having competing sets of hinge propo-
sitions, then there would be no controversy between them. They would not 
understand each other well enough to know how their views differed, or if 
indeed they did at all. It would be as though they actually spoke radically 
different, non-translatable languages–as though one of them communicat-
ed only by emitting certain scents from a special gland, and the other spoke 
the language represented by Greek Linear B. For us to cast moral disagree-
ments such as the hypothetical one between Alva and Britt as being like this 
is tempting, but involves us in problematic hyperbole. To know that one 
has a difference of moral opinion with another presupposes some sort of 
mutual understanding of the basic terms of the other’s moral vocabulary.7 
5 See for example Wellman (1959) for an excellent argument that ties together Witt-
gensteinian concerns about the possibility of a private language and the kind of semantic 
egocentrism that would be entailed by “private” hinge propositions. On Wittgenstein’s am-
bivalence regarding hinge propositions and a very interesting suggestion that it signals a 
deep problem in his thinking about them see Wolgast (1987). 
6 Fogelin’s reading here is simply strange. The more orthodox, objective status assigned 
to hinge propositions in Miller (1995), for example, supports anything but Fogelin’s read-
ing of the concept of “hinge propositions”.
7 This point is also made in Morawetz (1980). 
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That we might share such a vocabulary, among other non-trivial things un-
derwrites the criticism in Phillips (2008). There, Phillips suggests that the 
shared	background	for	argument	is	far	greater	than	it	might	at	first	appear.	
If she is right about this, as I believe that she is, then argumentation is far 
from hopeless even in cases of apparently deep disagreement. 
This does not mean that argumentation will always succeed given suf-
ficient	time	and	effort.	No	such	guarantee	is	necessary	to	redeem	the	use-
fulness of argumentation in cases of deep disagreement. (I will have more 
to say on this below.) As the present focus is on Fogelin’s diagnosis of deep 
disagreement, it is more pertinent to observe that the fact that direct argu-
ment fails in a range of cases does not entail, as he seems to think, that 
there is a single cause of the failure that explains them all—not even for 
the same discussants dealing with the same issue. Fogelin’s case for deep 
disagreement is therefore somewhat question-begging in the end. The only 
way to establish that argumentation will always fail in cases where world-
views clash is to assume beforehand that world-views are rationally incom-
mensurable. But as argumentation is a rational method of reaching an ac-
commodation between two different points of view (be they world-views or 
viewpoints of a more pedestrian kind), it follows only trivially that among 
the other things it might mean, incommensurability involves a foreclosure 
on argumentation.8 
In order for Fogelin’s case to get off the ground in a non-trivial way, 
he needs to demonstrate not that there are arguments that people pres-
ently cannot solve through argumentation but that there are disputes that 
in principle could not be resolved by argumentation, i.e. that there are dis-
putes so fractious that there is no possible world in which argumentation 
can move them forward. He does not do this. It’s hard to see how anyone 
could do it. For when we look at the worst disputes we have, we have no 
problem forming judgments about the possible conditions under which the 
8 This picture of incommensurability in itself is troubling, as it involves what Pinto 
(1995)	calls	“flat-out	epistemic	relativism”–a	view	with	several	features	that	make	it	wor-
thy of our avoidance. If it is a Wittgensteinian brand of moral relativism that is supposed 
to be on offer things go no better. Strangely enough it seems that Wittgenstein himself did 
not endorse such a relativism. For an overview of Wittgenstein’s moral thought see Rhees 
(1965). For his own words see Wittgenstein (1965). 
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parties might move forward. Nor do we have any problem at all making 
judgments about what the “real causes” of their inability to make progress 
are. This should increase our overall doubt about Fogelin’s picture.
A	final	consideration	in	this	vein	should	give	us	additional	pause	about	
Fogelin’s	fifth	premise	too.	In	addition	to	the	difficulties	I	have	raised	here	
about individuating the “forms of life” at issue in a deep disagreement, we 
do well to recall Adams worry that even if we could settle this matter we still 
might not be able to tell when a disagreement was “deep” enough to license 
the abandonment of argument: 
 
More generally, the logic of deep disagreement makes it impossible to 
specify a priori conditions such that, for any disagreement, satisfaction 
of	just	those	conditions	would	be	necessary	and	sufficient	epistemically	
to conclude that the disagreement is deep. The only way for the parties 
to know whether such a state of affairs obtains is by continuing to work 
through an attempt at rational discourse, and this because the question 
of whether a given disagreement is deep can only be settled by exhaust-
ing the possible resources of normal discourse. All of this means that the 
only way for the parties to establish that their disagreement is deep is to 
reject the very path of non-rational persuasion recommended by Foge-
lin and concentrate instead on their collective efforts at mutual persua-
sion by reasons. The only way, in other words, to come to know whether 
discourse is normal is to proceed as if it is. Adams (2005, p. 76) 
 
This brings us to the sixth premise of Fogelin’s argument. If the foregoing 
considerations are correct, then Fogelin-style deep disagreements simply 
don’t happen. Importantly, they do not happen because they are not pos-
sible, and they are not possible because there are no such things as private 
“hinge propositions”. Where human beings are capable of understanding 
each other’s speech, there always exists at least the potential for the rea-
soned resolution of any disagreement. 
4. The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement 
If the considerations are correct, then the likelihood of encountering the 
sort of incommensurability needed for Fogelin-style deep disagreements 
is vanishingly small. Why then, should we bother talking about “deep dis-
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agreements” at all? This is far from an idle question as it may seem to be 
in our best interest–at least from a practical point of view–to banish the 
language of deep disagreement from our vocabulary. This is because such 
language has the potential to be practically counter-productive: Simply de-
clare a disagreement to be “deep”, and we absolve ourselves of any moral 
or rational obligations we may be under to continue to struggle with it. We 
can see the rhetorical effect of such declarations in the American political 
context, where each side declares the other to be so far away from a reason-
able point of view that dialectical engagement is not only seen as impos-
sible, but as a kind of betrayal in that it might encourage the perception 
that the enemy’s point of view is to some degree reasonable. The opinion 
seems to be that rather than pursue rational dialectic it is better just to 
declare	 the	disagreement	“deep”	and	urge	fidelity	 to	“our	way”	of	 seeing	
things among those who already follow that way. Giving up rational means 
is easy, even satisfying in some instances. But very often our unwillingness 
to argue has little or nothing to do with the real (or supposed) “depth” of 
a disagreement. This is not to say that there are no serious disagreements. 
There surely are. That said, we do well to resist, as far as we are able, the 
temptation to draw the conclusion that we have arrived at such a pass until 
it is beyond the shadow of a doubt that we have. (And even then, argumen-
tation may still be better of the alternatives before us!) 
It is clear then, that there is a practical price to pay for retaining the no-
tion of deep disagreement. Is that price worth paying? I want to suggest in 
the remainder of this paper that it is. The principal reason for holding onto 
the idea of deep disagreement is not that there are or might be such things 
in the real world. It is because the idea of deep disagreement can serve a 
useful methodological purpose akin to that played by Cartesian skepticism 
in epistemology. In order to see how, it will be necessary to re-conceptual-
ize what it is for a disagreement to be “deep” in terminology other than that 
given in Fogelin’s problematic analysis. 
5. Deep Disagreement Reconceived 
Fogelin’s idea of deep disagreement, as we have seen, is subject to a large 
number of highly substantial objections. This does not, however, invalidate 
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the intuition that some disagreements are far more serious than others. 
This	 sensible	 intuition	 is	often	confirmed	 in	our	experience,	as	we	often	
find	ourselves	in	conflicts	with	others	that	resist	easy	dialectical	resolution.	
For those who want to develop a theory of argumentation that can respond 
to	these	difficult	cases,	it	will	prove	a	useful	theoretical	exercise	to	imagine	
features of disagreement that make the prospect of successful argumenta-
tion diminishingly small. This exercise must be pursued with care, for like 
Descartes’ evil demon case it is likely to be misunderstood. We are here 
seeking after the hypothetical limit of argumentation. The task is one of 
identifying those conditions under which it might seem that argument is 
as close to impossible as it can be. The point of the task is to see what, if 
anything, of argumentation might endure in such cases. Some or all of the 
following	characteristics,	or	characteristics	like	them,	seem	to	fit	the	bill:	
1. Duration: The dispute is not resolvable in a short span of time. 
2. Intensity: The parties to the disagreement exhibit a more powerful 
motivation to hang onto their positions than to seek a resolution to 
the disagreement. 
3. Opposition: The dispute would involve clear, diametrical opposition 
between what seem to be inconsistent propositions. 
4. Zero-summed-ness: The parties would see their gains as the losses of 
the other side, and vice-versa. 
5. Affect: The dispute would seep into the ways the parties see them-
selves, others, and the world, and the ways in which they respond to 
persons and conditions quite outside the scope of the disagreement. 
6. Polarization: The continued deliberation of the parties would tend 
to entrench them deeper in their own positions rather than opening 
them up to new positions. 
7. Fragility: The parties would exhibit a greater than usual readiness to 
engage in intentional behavior that derails the dialogue (e.g. name-
calling, straw-man attacks, etc.). 
8. Mistrust: The parties would not trust each other to judge objectively, 
but expect them to seek their own advantage at all times, using any 
means available to them including fallacious means. 
9. Indeterminateness: There would be no external principles, criteria, 
judgments	or	authoritative	figures	acceptable	to	all	parties	to	whom	
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appeal can be made for uncontroversially just resolution of the dis-
agreement. 
While this list makes no pretense at being a complete account, it does sum 
up some of the central features that together make a disagreement deep in 
the sense of reducing considerably the chance for successful episodes of 
argumentation. A brief look at each of these characteristics, with the help 
of a few examples, will help us get clearer as to the nature of the proposal. 
5.1. The Characteristics of Deep Disagreement 
5.1.1. Duration 
Most of the disagreements human beings experience are resolved within the 
space of no more than a handful of conversations. In a deep disagreement, 
however, there seems to be no end to the process of mulling over the clash-
ing positions. Neither side will admit defeat nor give concessions that it sees 
as leading to defeat. As the making of concessions is typically the engine that 
drives a dialectical exchange to its close, deep disagreements are prolonged 
beyond the usual lifespan of differences of opinion. The public debate over 
abortion in the United States is one such disagreement. While most of the 
world has reached a social settlement regarding the question of whether or 
not abortion should be legally permitted, the debate in the US, now well 
over forty years old, shows no sign of impending resolution. This dispute 
also illustrates the kind of thing that people often have in mind when they 
characterize a debate as “interminable”. In point of fact this is not some-
thing that can be known. What can be said is that a debate has gone on for a 
very long time, and that is all the property of duration is meant to pick out. 
5.1.2. Intensity 
The intensity of a deep disagreement is marked by the resistance to down-
ward	revision	of	the	participants’	levels	of	confidence	in	their	standpoints	
despite being bombarded with counter-arguments and evidence to the 
contrary. Indeed, there are cases where the resolution of a difference of 
opinion is clear but neither side will follow the path to it out of blind adher-
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ence to their own position. It is worth noting in this connection the familiar 
point from the logic of belief revision that an agent who never revises his 
levels	of	confidence	is	irrational	in	particularly	problematic	way.	Neverthe-
less, that is what seems to happen in debates like the abortion debate. On 
both the pro and contra sides, positions become so entrenched as to make 
their proponents appear to be oblivious to rational criticism. 
5.1.3. Opposition 
That opposition should be a hallmark of deep disagreement should not be 
surprising,	 so	we	may	pass	 over	 it	with	 little	 comment.	 Suffice	 it	 to	 say	
that typically the parties to a deep disagreement hold positions that are so 
opposed that they straightforwardly entail the falsehood of their opposite 
number.	Deep	disagreements	by	definition	 are	not	 situations	where	 one	
party is undecided, or simply playing the “devil’s advocate.” 
5.1.4. Zero-summed-ness 
It is because of the intensity and the opposition of the views of the parties 
that the dialectic takes on the character of a zero-sum game wherein one 
party’s loss is the gain of the other and vice-versa. There are, of course, mod-
els of dialectic on offer wherein every argued exchange is like this, but here I 
wish to hold something different.9 In an ordinary round of argumentation it 
is possible for all of the parties to come closer together in at least some way, 
to wind up with better coordinated sets of commitments than they other-
wise would were they to forego argumentation for some other communica-
tive choice. Hence zero-summed-ness is a very special property indeed. 
5.1.5. Affect 
Just as intensity and opposition drive zero-summed-ness, duration together 
with these three drives affect. The affect of a deep disagreement is measured 
9 Some hold that this is Krabbe’s view as result of misinterpretations of remarks in 
works of his like Krabbe (2008). I believe his view is more nuanced, as can be seen in 
Krabbe (2009).
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by the degree to which the participants come to see themselves in terms of 
their position vis a vis the disagreement, and the social world they inhabit as 
demarcated by those on their side and those on the wrong side. The term ’af-
fect’ is chosen for this characteristic because it appropriately captures the de-
gree to which commitment to a side in a deep disagreement slips the bounds 
of the straightforwardly cognitive and blends into the more straightforward-
ly emotional. No phenomenon better captures the idea of effect than that of 
the single-issue voter, whose only political allegiance is to the person or party 
most likely to advocate for what she sees as the correct side of some social 
debate. Indeed, such voters often let the whole of their political outlook be 
driven in such ways.10 In Europe examples in which single-issue voting might 
be found would be environmental issues, or perhaps those of immigration. 
In North America single- issue voting abounds, and many persons can be 
found who openly profess to voting only based on their concerns about abor-
tion, gun control, or (increasingly) free market economic policy. 
5.1.6. Polarization 
Polarization, according to Cass Sunstein, is the tendency of “members of a 
deliberating group [to] predictably move toward a more extreme point in 
the direction indicated by the members’ pre-deliberation tendencies.” (Sun-
stein 2003, 81) It is a well-documented intra-group phenomenon that occurs 
not just in contentious deliberations but in deliberations in general, across a 
multiplicity of contexts. It is well within the bounds of the research to claim 
polarization	as	a	defining	property	of	deep	disagreements.	This	is	because	it	
is reasonable to think that disagreements that exhibit the properties of af-
fect and intensity will almost certainly be the sort that lead agents to take 
more extreme versions of their viewpoints. Let us be clear, however, that 
“extreme” here does not mean necessarily that one is in the grip of a particu-
lar ideology, only that one holds an outlying position of particular force on 
the issue in question. For example, a party to the disagreement over whether 
professional athletes should make so much more money than teachers who 
claimed, independently of her other views, that professional athletes should 
10 See the account in Baron (2009) for a good description of the empirical research 
around this phenomenon. 
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be paid nothing could rightly be seen as embracing an “extreme” position 
in the requisite sense regardless of what her other commitments were. The 
extremity of her view, if maintained forcefully enough in the deliberations of 
her group, would (in theory) be enough to trigger a polarizing effect. 
5.1.7. Fragility 
If polarization means that intra-group deliberations become more and 
more extreme, then it should stand to reason that as the group’s position 
becomes more and more polarized it’s inter-group activities become more 
and more deeply affected. The result of polarization then, is an increas-
ing openness to dialectical tactics that are likely to derail a dialogue, such 
as straw-man and fallacious ad hominem attacks. Examples of this sort of 
state of affairs are so numerous that the reader will surely be able to call 
to mind a half-dozen examples of his or her own. To take a silly example, 
however, one might point to the readiness with which pundits and elected 
officials	in	America	draw	comparisons	between	their	opponents	and	Adolf	
Hitler. Of course we dismiss these comparisons as hyperbole or just plain 
silliness, but the signal they send is clear: “We are willing to say anything 
to discredit our opponents.” As such, they make any dialogue that might be 
possible between the parties incredibly fragile. 
5.1.8. Mistrust 
While their causes are many and varied, situations of mistrust are exactly 
what they sound like–situations in which neither party trusts the other to 
refrain from the kind of measures that would provoke a derailment. It is 
important to keep in mind that mistrust can exist not just in cases where 
the parties know each other, but in cases where they do not. There are also 
cases	where	mistrust	is	provoked	by	the	flouting	of	conventions	surround-
ing the type of dialogue that the parties are supposed to have, e.g. standing 
to speak, conventions of civility, etc. 
5.1.9. Indeterminateness 
The indeterminateness of deep disagreements lies in the fact that there is 
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no party who is recognized by those in the disagreement as a legitimate 
authority to which appeal might be made in order to settle the difference 
between them. If one or the other party sees it’s view as licensed by the 
deliverances of such an authority, that authority will inevitably be rejected 
by the other parties to the disagreement. Since there are no agreed-upon 
judges	the	parties	find	themselves	in	the	dialectical	equivalent	of	a	Lockean	
state of nature, with all its attendant disadvantages: partiality, susceptibil-
ity to overreaches due to passionate attachment to their own causes, and an 
ensuing state of “confusion and disorder”. (Locke, 1988) 
5.2. Evaluating the Proposed Model of Deep Disagreement 
Is the model of deep disagreement based on factors like the above-men-
tioned eight an improvement on Fogelin’s model? It seems to me that there 
are several reasons to think so.
Notice immediately that these factors do not include considerations 
about causes of the disagreement. It is not assumed that the parties can-
not speak intelligibly to each other, or that they do not share standards of 
reason, rationality or argument. This is in part due to the fact that it is not 
assumed that the parties inhabit radically different life-worlds or entertain 
different “framework” propositions. This is intentional, as a cogent account 
of disagreement should be able to admit of many possible causes, includ-
ing that the parties have been mislead into thinking that their disagree-
ment is deep when it really isn’t, that the disagreement might be based on 
mutual misunderstandings, or that circumstances are such that no party 
really	has	sufficient	evidence	to	conclusively	establish	it’s	point	of	view.	To	
be maximally useful such an account should also be able to apply along a 
continuum of more and less serious cases. The view of deep disagreement 
sketched by the eight properties above can be used in this way.
In addition to being neutral as to the causes, an adequate account should 
contain within its ambit the possibility of intra-group (or intra-framework) 
deep disagreement. This is an advantage of the view I am proposing and 
serious oversight in Fogelin’s view, as some of the most costly and last-
ing and otherwise “deep” disagreements in history have had their roots in 
intra-group disagreements wherein all the participants shared precisely 
the same world-view, framework propositions, etc. The rise of Protestant-
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ism and the subsequent four centuries of religious warfare that followed in 
Europe is a particularly telling case of this phenomenon. If such cases must 
be accounted for, then any theory of deep disagreement must capture them 
if it aspires to account for the phenomenon in anything like a complete 
sense. The model on offer here can accommodate them. Though the parties 
began as members of the same group—arguably the same “life-world”--the 
schism between Protestants and Catholics involved nearly all eight factors 
by	the	time	open	war	was	happening.	It	would	take	this	paper	too	far	afield	
of its purpose to give a detailed account of the evolution of the deep dis-
agreement between the parties, but it does seems as though properties like 
those described here could be used for such a purpose. Fogelin’s model 
could not be used in this way, and so is less powerful.
There is one further general advantage of the account on offer here that 
bears notice. This advantage is a logical one: The proffered analysis of deep 
disagreement does not necessitate that such disagreements are by nature 
insoluble. This prevents the criticisms of circularity, or question-begging 
to which Fogelin’s view is prone. To put it another way, ’deep’ here is a 
synonym	for	difficult,	not	for	’impossible’.	
In the aforementioned ways, then, it seems as though the account of 
deep disagreement put forward in this paper does have some advantages 
over that put forward by Fogelin. For all that, it might still be wondered 
whether	 or	not	we’ve	 really	put	 our	finger	on	anything	 that	picks	 out	 a	
unique property of “depth” here at all. My conclusion is that we have not. 
For all that the analysis may give us, it only really gives us a cluster of con-
ditions under which reaching an agreement is very hard to do. Whether 
we	call	controversies	thus	afflicted	“deep	disagreements”	or	not	is	a	mat-
ter of art. Really there are only just disagreements, and some of them are 
tougher nuts to crack than others. This is not to say, however, that think-
ing in terms of deep disagreement may not have some serious theoreti-
cal	or	methodological	benefits.	In	the	final	section	of	this	paper	I	want	to	
argue that deep disagreement poses a limiting case for the theory of argu-
mentation in much the same way that the Cartesian demon case poses a 
limiting case for traditional epistemology. If this contention is right, then 
I believe we should see that thinking about how to address worries about 
deep disagreements spurs us to interesting conclusions about the uses of 
argument. 
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6. Deep Disagreement and Argumentation at the Limit 
Let us suppose that it seems as though Alva and Britt cannot resolve their 
disagreement over abortion by arguing about abortion. What argumenta-
tive strategies might work? What is required of the parties in order to make 
them work? If we reject Fogelin’s contention that disagreement’s being 
deep means a fortiori that it is impossible to resolve by argumentation, 
we can approach these questions in much the same way that Descartes ap-
proaches the question of what he can know even if he lives in a universe 
dominated	by	an	omnipotent	deceiver.	While	we	will	not	find	our	results	
quite so earth-shaking as he does, the methodological parallel holds: We 
are asking about argumentation at the limit, in other words, about the uses 
of argumentation in those situations in which the circumstances for its ef-
ficacy	(perhaps	even	its	possibility)	are	least	in	evidence.	
We can group the strategies into four generalized families of approach: 
rhetorical strategies, those I will call “emergent solution” approaches, ne-
gotiation dialogue, and incompletely theorized agreements. As these are 
not hard and fast categories but only “familial” groupings there will be 
some overlap between them. This, I think, is apt, because in any given case 
of deep disagreement one would not be surprised to see them used (wheth-
er consciously or not) in concert with one another. 
My inclusion of rhetorical approaches indicates another point of depar-
ture from Fogelin’s thesis that needs to be made explicit. In saying that 
deep disagreements require us to abandon argument in favor of persua-
sion, Fogelin seems to indicate that the techniques of persuasion i.e. rhe-
torical techniques) are non-rational. I do not accept the narrow vision of 
rationality that Fogelin’s dichotomy implies. It would take this paper too 
far	afield	of	its	purpose	to	make	the	case	for	the	rationality	of	rhetoric,	but	
I believe that careful students of the discipline will have no problem seeing 
how such a case would be made.11 
11	Those	who	are	not	 satisfied	by	my	hand-waving	on	 this	 score	might	 consult	God-
den and Brenner (2011) in this journal. The chapters on rhetoric in Frans H. van Eemeren 
(1996), the essay by David Zarefsky I refer to in section 6.1 below, and Kauffeld (2007) 
also give good reason to doubt that there is something irrational per se about rhetorical 
methods of persuasion.
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6.1. Rhetorical Approaches 
Zarefsky (2010) suggests several rhetorical approaches to dealing with 
deep disagreement that maneuver around the participants’ unwillingness 
to engage in direct argumentation. These include appeals to time con-
straints or a sense of emergency, a shared sense of exhaustion in living 
with the problem, attempts to repackage the dispute as being fundamen-
tally about something with respect to which the participants have no prob-
lematic commitments, and uncovering inconsistencies or latent hypocrisy 
in one party’s position. Though Zarefsky does not use the concept of deep 
disagreement sketched here as the limiting case, it is easy to see how his 
suggestions are aimed at factors that do occur in the present conception. 
Appeals to time constraints attack deep disagreements at the level of du-
ration, the sense of exhaustion appeals to considerations of affect, and 
repackaging is a maneuver designed to skirt the problems of opposition 
and zero-summed-ness. One could even see the appeals to inconsistency 
as aimed at invoking principles of logic that are ostensibly acceptable to all 
parties in order to reduce the scope of the indeterminateness affecting the 
dispute. All of these, it is safe to say, would involve a fairly sustained and 
intensive level of argumentative exchange even if those arguments were 
not explicitly directed to the problematic difference of opinion. 
In the case of Alva and Britt, one might imagine them beginning from a 
recognition	that	abortion’s	dominance	as	an	issue	makes	it	difficult	to	deal	
with other, equally pressing problems, and drawing from this recognition 
the cognitive and emotional reserves necessary to keep their argumentative 
dialogue going in the hope of reaching a settlement. This would be some-
thing akin to Zarefsky’s time-based strategy. Though (sadly) these seldom 
make into the broader social discussion of the issue, the philosophical lit-
erature on abortion is rife with attempts to repackage the problem in ways 
that do not invoke the opposition of women’s rights and the sanctity of the 
life of the fetus. The only limits to a repackaging strategy are the creativity 
and patience of the arguers.12 Thus the failure of such strategies to produce 
12 Lugg (1986), following Dewey, makes a similar point though he draws a far different 
lesson from it than I do here.
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argued agreements may say more about them than about the usefulness of 
argument in such situations. Clearly, at least, there is a set of options to be 
tried along these lines before giving up. Of course, to resist the temptation 
to give up requires a certain amount of good faith. Britt and Alva have to 
believe in each other’s integrity as arguers and that continued argumenta-
tion	offers	the	hope	of	resolution	as	well.	This	sort	of	hope	figures	promi-
nently in the next family of approaches: the emergent solution approaches. 
6.2. Emergent Solution Approaches 
These	 approaches,	 exemplified	 by	 Adams	 (2005)	 are	 best	 characterized	
as aimed at opposition and zero-summed-ness that (interestingly) bite 
the bullet where duration is concerned. Adams contends that even if it is 
not immediately productive of resolution, continued argumentation might 
help to identify and isolate shared values that eventually lead to resolu-
tions. This is the most optimistic of the approaches considered here, and 
perhaps	potentially	the	most	problematic.	No	one	has	infinite	patience	for	
conflict,	even	under	ideal	circumstances.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	we	have	
phrases like “We simply must agree to disagree about this matter.” in our 
toolkit. Be that as it may the valuable insight in Adams’ contention is that to 
reach an impasse in one’s argumentation with others does not necessarily 
foreclose on the possibility of ever reaching a resolution. Even in the deep-
est of disagreements it is important to keep the possibility of resolution 
alive, and this is done in part by continued argumentation. 
The	benefit	of	doing	so	is	that	one	avails	oneself	of	the	possibility	for	ex-
tended	reflection	not	just	about	one’s	opponent’s	position	but	about	one’s	
own. As anyone who thinks in this way will immediately recognize, this 
process can be deeply revelatory of one’s own intuitions and commitments. 
Once	discovered,	extended	reflection	about	these	intuitions	and	commit-
ments can provide the perspective needed for rational com- promise, or for 
the realization of previously unseen resolutions. The salient point here is 
that sustained argumentation, if perhaps not strictly necessary for such re-
flection,	is	undoubtedly	one	of	the	best	ways	we	know	to	stimulate	it.	Hence	
Adams’s suggestion is not as naïve as one might initially imagine. 
There	are	those	instances	however,	when	one	finds	it	so	difficult	to	enter	
into	 imaginative	 sympathy	with	one’s	 interlocutors	 that	 extended	 reflec-
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tion may not be a promising way to proceed. In such instances, when the 
circumstances are pressing enough to warrant it, there are still the avenues 
of negotiation dialogue and incompletely theorized agreements–both of 
which yet make substantial use of argumentation. 
6.3. Incompletely Theorized Agreements 
If	 emergent	 solution	 approaches	 to	 difficult	 disagreements	 are	 perhaps	
overly optimistic, Cass Sunstein’s notion of incompletely theorized agree-
ments may provide us with a more realistic strategy. He describes agree-
ments as “incompletely theorized” 
in the sense that the relevant participants are clear on the result without 
agreeing on the most general theory that accounts for it. Often they can 
agree on an opinion or a rationale, usually offering low-level or mid-
level principles. They may agree that a rule–reducing water pollution, 
allowing workers to unionize–makes sense without entirely agreeing on 
the	foundations	of	their	belief.	They	may	accept	an	outcome–reaffirm-
ing the right to have an abortion, protecting sexually explicit art–with-
out understanding or converging on an ultimate ground for that accep-
tance. What accounts for the opinion, in terms of a full-scale theory of 
the right or the good, is left unexplained. (Sunstein 1996, 5) 
Here, clearly, arguments are not just required, but must be skillfully de-
ployed if the disagreement at issue is to be resolved. Unlike bargaining, 
incompletely theorized agreements need not be thought of as brute-force 
struggles between camps of different interest groups. Like bargaining, 
however, the parties do need to abandon any hope of total victory for their 
“full-scale theory” of what ought to be done or believed. If incompletely 
theorized agreements do allow us a reasonable path to solving apparently 
deep disagreements, then it is clear that they belong in the playbook. 
6.4. Negotiation Dialogues 
One of the principal contributions of Walton (2008) and before it Walton/
Krabbe (1995) is the widening of the theory of dialogue to include multiple 
types. Negotiation is one of these types. On pp. 6-7 of the more recent of the 
two	works	just	mentioned,	Walton	defines	it	as	follows:	
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In negotiation dialogue the primary goal is self-interest, and the method 
is to bargain. Bargaining makes no pretension to be an objective inquiry 
into the truth of a matter. Indeed, negotiation, in contrast to persuasion 
dialogue, need not involve commitment to the truth of propositions, or 
conviction that ideals are based on strong arguments. In negotiation, 
opinions about what is true, or convictions about what is believable, are 
not centrally at stake, and may even be contravened by a good negotia-
tor. The concessions in bargaining are not commitments in the same 
sense	as	in	the	persuasion	dialogue,	but	trade-offs	that	can	be	sacrificed	
for gains else- where. The position now becomes a bargaining position. 
Logical proof is not important in negotiation dialogue, for this type of 
dialogue is strictly adversarial. 
The important point here is that resolution occurs not as a result of logi-
cal proof that one’s position is true or the correct course of action, but as 
a result of the parties reaching an accord they can live with under the cir-
cumstances. Even though argumentation by itself does not settle matters 
in	negotiation,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	negotiations	from	which	all	species	
of argument were entirely absent. For our purposes the salient point about 
negotiation dialogue is that it assumes nearly all of the characteristics at-
tributed to our Cartesian limiting case (the possible exception being dura-
tion–even though it is not unknown for negotiation dialogues to last far 
longer than is expected or wished). 
7. Conclusion 
If the foregoing considerations are correct, then some form or other of ar-
gumentation is possible even in the limiting case of deep disagreement. 
The idea of deep disagreement is useful then, because it helps us to think 
about	strategies	for	approaching	difficult	communicative	situations	where	
we must reason together with others. Drawing on the extant literature I 
have sketched some of these strategies here and shown how they answer 
certain features of what I’ve called the limiting case of argumentation: the 
Cartesian worst-case scenario for the prospect of successful argument. As 
such, in order to be useful the limiting case need not be realized in any 
actual encounter, it’s usefulness may be purely methodological. Thus, even 
if there are no situations that conform to the criteria for the limiting case, 
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it still serves argumentation theory well. In this wise it represents an im-
provement over Fogelin’s notion of deep disagreement, which is based on 
questionable assumptions coupled with an equally questionable reading of 
one text in the Wittgensteinian corpus. Perhaps the most important respect 
in which the limiting case represents an improvement over Fogelin’s no-
tion of deep disagreement is that it aims not to tell us when argumentation 
is impossible, but how argumentation theorists can strategize to develop 
stronger tools with which to improve the way go about dealing with the 
most challenging disagreements we have. 
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